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THE PROGRESSION OF TRIGGER LITIGATION IN
MARYLAND-DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE TRIGGER
OF COVERAGE, ITS LIMITATIONS, AND RAMIFICATIONS
LEE H. OGBURN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the myriad insurance coverage disputes pending across the
country, courts and litigants face the question of whether the insur-
ance policies at issue were "triggered." Courts have not established
uniform principles to resolve this question.' The Maryland Court of
Appeals recently added its voice to this debate and in the process fun-
damentally changed insurance law in Maryland. In Lloyd E. Mitchell,
Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co.2 and Harford County v. Harford Mutual In-
surance Co.,' the court abandoned the "manifestation" theory for de-
termining when a policy is triggered and replaced it with the "injury-
in-fact" theory.4
This Article discusses the ramifications of the court's decision to
adopt injury in fact as the trigger of coverage for the standard com-
mercial general liability insurance policy. The Article compares the
strengths and weaknesses of the injury-in-fact trigger with those of
other trigger theories. The Article first examines cases from jurisdic-
tions outside of Maryland and describes and analyzes their different
trigger theories. It then examines the development of trigger theory
under Maryland law. Finally, the Article suggests how Maryland courts
* Partner, Kramon & Graham, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland. B.A., 1972, University of
North Carolina; J.D., 1975, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Trigger litigation emerged in the late 1970s with the advent of asbestos-related
claims. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (involving a dispute over which insurance carrier had a duty to defend
Forty-Eight Insulations in over 250 asbestos-related lawsuits), affld, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), reh'g granted and clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
Trigger litigation has continued unabated not only in asbestos-related cases but also in
cases involving other toxic torts and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1988) (CERCLA). See, e.g., American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984) (involving a dis-
pute over whether an insurance policy covered injuries arising from the sale of
pharmaceuticals); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (involving a dispute over whether an insurance policy covered the cost of a CERCLA
clean up). See generally KENNETH A. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LiAnlrrv INSURANCE LAw 91-
128, 225-28 (1991).
2. 324 Md. 44, 595 A.2d 469 (1991).
3. 327 Md. 418, 610 A.2d 286 (1992).
4. See infra notes 74-77, 89-93 and accompanying text.
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should implement the new injury-in-fact trigger. Specifically, the Arti-
cle suggests that, when expert testimony cannot provide evidence es-
tablishing the actual time of injury, the court should apportion
liability among the various insurers on a pro rata, rather than a joint
and several, basis.
II. TRIGGER LITIGATION OUTSIDE MARYLAND
It is important for context to understand the "trigger" provisions
of the standard form Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance
policy'-the policy that most businesses purchase to protect against
claims that third parties assert for bodily injury or property damage-
before delving into the trigger cases. Since 1966, the standard CGL
policy has provided that the insurer will pay "those sums that the in-
sured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily
injury' or 'property damage' to which [the] insurance applies."7 The
standard CGL policy limits the scope of the insuring agreement by
stating that "It] his insurance applies only to 'bodily injury' and 'prop-
erty damage' which occurs during the policy period. The 'bodily in-
jury' or 'property damage' must be caused by an 'occurrence."'"
These provisions are easy to apply when the event giving rise to a
claim against the insured is a sudden accident causing an immediately
apparent injury.9 In other circumstances, however, the question of
when policy coverage is triggered becomes more complex. For exam-
5. The standard CGL policy, formerly known as the "Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity" insurance policy, underwent significant revisions in 1947, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1986.
See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 24. This Article addresses the issues raised by the language in
the 1966, 1973, and 1986 forms.
6. lId at 25.
7. Id. at 274 (quoting from the 1986 standard CGL policy).
8. Id at 274 (quoting from the 1986 standard CGL policy). Between 1966 and 1973,
the requirement that the "bodily injury" or "property damage" occur during the policy
period was contained in the definition of "occurrence," which was: "an accident, including
injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury
and property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
d at 299 (quoting from the 1966 standard CGL policy).
Although the requirement that the injury or damage occur "during the policy period"
was deleted from the definition of"occurrence" in 1973, id at 288 (quoting from the 1973
standard CGL policy), the definitions of "bodily injury" and "property damage" were modi-
fied to include that requirement. Id at 287-88. "Bodily injury" was defined as "bodily in-
jury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period."
Id at 287. "Property damage" was defined as "physical injury to or destruction of tangible
property which occurs during the policy period." Id. at 288.
9. For example, when a person asserts a claim alleging traumatic injury resulting from
being hit on the head by a box that fell off a shelf in the ABC Shoe Store, one can deter-
mine easily that coverage of the insurance policy in effect on the date of the accident is
"triggered."
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ple, when a claim arises out of a third party's extended exposure to a
toxic substance manufactured by the insured that results in a disease
which remains latent for several decades, it is unclear whether the ini-
tial exposure to the substance, the manifestation of the disease, or
some event during the latency period triggers coverage. Resolving the
issue of when coverage is triggered is important because only a trig-
gered policy potentially covers the injury.
Courts have concluded that exposure, latency, occurrence of the
injury, or manifestation-and even combinations of these-will "trig-
ger" coverage. Corresponding trigger theories followed: the expo-
sure theory, the manifestation theory, the triple-trigger theory, and
the injury-in-fact theory. 0 The inconsistent conclusions that courts
have reached in interpreting the same policy language seem to result
from these courts' desire to expand the scope of coverage.
For example, in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, Inc.,"1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
concluded that it was exposure to the harmful substance (asbestos fi-
bers) that triggered coverage for personal injury claims by asbestos
workers, stating that "we are bound to broadly construe the insurance
policies to promote coverage. 12 The court reasoned that under any
trigger theory other than exposure "the manufacturer's coverage be-
comes illusory since the manufacturer will likely be unable to secure
any insurance coverage in later years when the disease manifests it-
self."13 Based in part on this reasoning, the court concluded that the
exposure trigger represented the correct interpretation of the stan-
dard CGL policy.1 4
In Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reached essentially
10. See infra text accompanying notes 11-23.
11. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), reh'g granted and clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
12. Id. at 1219. In Forty-Eight Insulations, the Insurance Company of North America
sought a declaration as to which insurers had a duty to defend or indemnify Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc. against lawsuits arising out of its manufacture of asbestos products. Id at
1214. The lower court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan, had ruled that the policies of each insurer that insured Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.
during the exposure period were triggered. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1978), affd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980),
reh'g granted and clarfied 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
13. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1219.
14. See id. at 1223.
15. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983). In this case, Eagle-
Picher Industries, Inc., a manufacturer of products containing asbestos, sought a declara-
tion that its insurers between 1968 and 1980 had to provide coverage for asbestos-related
claims based on the "manifestation" trigger theory. Id at 15-16. Some of Eagle-Picher's
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the opposite conclusion, stating that "in this case, the public policy
underpinnings of insurance law support the manifestation result." 6
This court also demonstrated an interest in expanding the available
insurance coverage. 7 It explained that " [c] overage based on manifes-
tation was certainly more desirable than coverage based on exposure,
given that Eagle-Picher was uninsured during the longest period of
exposure and that the number of claims was accelerating during the
period of coverage."18
Yet a third interpretation of the standard CGL policy, the "triple
trigger" theory, was announced in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America. 9 The Keene court concluded that using a "triple trigger"-
under which coverage is triggered during exposure, 20 upon manifesta-
tion,21 and during the latency period"-was the only way to ensure
that Keene Corporation received full and complete indemnity for all
of its asbestos-related losses.23
The common thread in these opinions is the courts' desire to
resolve policy interpretation issues in a way that maximizes coverage. 4
insurers countered by arguing that exposure was the appropriate trigger of coverage. Id. at
16.
16. Id. at 23.
17. Seeid.
18. Id.
19. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Keene Corp.
sought a declaratory judgment that its insurers from 1961 to 1980 were obligated to pro-
vide coverage for bodily injury claims against it arising out of exposure to asbestos-laden
products. Id. at 1039.
20. Id at 1045.
21. Id at 1044.
22. Id at 1046-47.
23. See id. at 1050.
24. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1232
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that court should "resolve doubts in favor of maximizing cover-
age"), affid, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), reh'g granted and clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682
F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that policies should be construed to "promote the
policy objective of providing coverage"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983); Keene Corp., 667
F.2d at 1050 (holding that a triple trigger theory "is the only way that Keene can be assured
the security that it purchased with each policy"). These courts are not alone in their view
that a victory for the insured fulfills some public policy and advances a common good.
Judge Sarokin of the United States District Court for the District of NewJersey invoked the
sanctity of contract when he expressed his view that "insurance companies can be seen
scurrying about the courts of this country in search of ways to avoid honoring their poli-
cies." Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257, 258 (D.NJ.
1983). Judge Sarokin concluded that "[t]he presumption should be in support of coverage,
rather than its rejection." Id.
This result-oriented approach leads to jurisprudential problems, however, see supra
note 25, and raises other important questions. For example, is it in the public interest for a
polluter to enjoy relief from financial responsibility for the consequences of its conduct by
1994]
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This result-oriented approach has made it difficult or impossible to
reconcile the courts' decisions with any legal principle.25 Indeed, sev-
eral courts and commentators have noted that trigger litigation has
become a repository of result-oriented jurisprudence.26
III. TRIGGER LITIGATION IN MARYLAND
A. The Manifestation Trigger
1. The Cases.-The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was the first court to find and apply Maryland law in a
shifting that responsibility to an insurer? Being able to shift accountability to an insurer
may reduce or remove a polluter's incentive not to pollute. In turn, the insurer that is held
responsible for the costs of the cleanup will attempt to pass on those costs to other insureds
through increased premiums. Consequently, the cost of cleaning up after the culpable few
is shouldered by the nonculpable many. In a sense, this constitutes a tax imposed by the
judiciary.
Although it may be true that the public benefits when a solvent insurer is held respon-
sible for cleaning up the toxic mess created by an insolvent insured, the public policy issues
raised by insurance coverage litigation are not as simple to resolve as some courts appear to
believe. The issues extend far beyond merely locating the deepest pocket.
25. Some courts have cited as the controlling legal principle the maxim that ambigui-
ties in a contract must be resolved against the drafter, which, in the case of a standard CGL
policy, is the insurer. See, e.g., Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1041 ("We are aided in our analysis
of these policies' coverage by the well-accepted rule that ambiguity in an insurance con-
tract must be construed in favor of the insured."). Cf American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("This [contra-insurer] rule
of construction, in fact, appears to be the single factor that unified the discordant opinions
applying the CGL [policy] and its derivatives to insidious diseases."), aff'd as modified, 748
F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984).
The idea that ambiguities not resolved through extrinsic evidence should be con-
strued against the drafter is well entrenched in American jurisprudence. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). This idea does not, however, logically lead to the
conclusion that a court faced with a dispute about the meaning of a clause in an insurance
contract is obliged to resolve the case in the way that will maximize the sum of money that
the insurer pays to the insured. Courts' efforts to do so have brought about the existing
situation in which a standard-form contract is interpreted inconsistently on a case-by-case
basis, based on post-contractual circumstances that had nothing to do with the drafting of
the contract or the intent of the parties when the contract was made. See supra notes 11-23
and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 126 n.35 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("The central basis for the Keene holding, however, was the panel's conclusion that
their central objective 'must be to give effect to the policies' dominant purpose of indem-
nity.'") (quoting Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1041); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F.
Supp. 1368, 1392 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[T]he Keene court viewed its mission as ensuring that
the manufacturer received complete indemnity for all its asbestos-related losses."); BARRY
RI OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DIsPUTES
§ 9.03[a] (5th ed. 1992) ("One of the problems in insurance law is that it is result oriented.
In an effort to compensate litigants, the courts have manipulated concepts of contract law
and interpretations of insurance contracts and have vastly expanded theories of liability
and contractual relationships." (citing Standard Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co. v. Royal
Indem. Ins. Co., No. CV80-14909, slip op. at 9 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jackson County, Apr. 3, 1986)).
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complex trigger dispute. In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co.)2 7
the court held that the "manifestation" of the injury was the appropri-
ate trigger of coverage. 8 Mraz involved a claim by the United States
and the State of Maryland against Galaxy Chemical, Inc. (Galaxy)
under CERCLA.29 The plaintiffs sought to recover the costs they had
incurred in cleaning up a site where Galaxy had buried drums of haz-
ardous waste, which had began to leak and contaminate the soil and
groundwater."0 Canadian Universal Insurance Co. (Canadian Univer-
sal) had insured Galaxy from 1966 through January 1, 1970,"' and
Galaxy had buried the drums in August 1969, within the coverage 'pe-
riod of the Canadian Universal policies.3 2 In 1982, twelve years after
the last Canadian Universal policy expired, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the State of Maryland removed the buried drums and
cleaned up the site."3 Although soil testing in 1981 established that
hazardous substances had been released from the drums and poten-
tially could continue to be released, it was unclear when the leakage
actually had begun. 4
The Canadian Universal insurance policies defined an "occur-
rence" as "'an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions,
which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property dam-
age, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured."'35 The Fourth Circuit recognized that, based on this
language, the event that triggered coverage was bodily injury or prop-
erty damage, not wrongful conduct: "The general rule is that '[t]he
time of the occurrence of an accident within the meaning of an in-
demnity policy is not the time the wrongful act was committed but the
time when the complaining party was actually damaged."'3 6
Having correctly stated this principle, however, the court then
abandoned it. The court reasoned that "[d] etermining exactly when
damage begins [in buried hazardous waste cases] can be difficult, if
27. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
28. Id. at 1328.
29. Id at 1326.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 1I
34. Id. at 1328.
35. Id. at 1327 (quoting the Galaxy insurance policy).
36. Id. at 1328 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345
N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting, in turn, C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Occur-
rence of Accident or Injury as During, or Before or After, Time Period of Coverage of Liability Policy,
57 A.L.R.2d 1385, 1389 (1958))).
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not impossible."37 Therefore, the court deemed the occurrence to
take place when the injuries first manifest themselves and held that, at
least in buried waste cases, manifestation of the property damage is
the event that triggers coverage.3 8
The court's adoption of the "manifestation" trigger clearly was
prompted by its view that proving the actual time of the property dam-
age would be a potentially insurmountable obstacle. 9 In the face of
this obstacle, the court believed that selecting a trigger based on a
clearly ascertainable event-manifestation of damage or injury-was
the best available option.
Two years later, in Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jacobson,4 ° the
Court of Special Appeals extended the Mraz rule to encompass cover-
age disputes in which proving the actual time of a claimed bodily in-
jury was not difficult.4 1 The Jacobson case required a determination of
whether a landlord-lessor's liability insurance policy covered damages
related to the lead-paint poisoning of a tenant. The landlord-lessor in
Jacobson, Israel Louis Shapiro, owned sixty-nine one-family rental
properties in Baltimore City.42 Following Shapiro's death, Shapiro's
estate obtained a liability insurance policy effective June 3, 1983, cov-
ering claims for bodily injury or property damage arising out of own-
ership of the properties.43 Shapiro had leased one of the properties,
1429 Madison Avenue, to Brenda Carter, who lived there with her
daughter Keisha.44
On August 25, 1983, during the coverage period of the Harford
Mutual policy, the Baltimore City Health Department issued a "Viola-
tion Notice to Remove Lead Paint Nuisance" to Jacobson concerning
the 1429 Madison Avenue property.45 The violation notice indicated
that Keisha Carter had an elevated blood-lead level and that the lead
paint on the premises had to be removed.46 Shortly thereafter, the
Carters filed suit against Jacobson in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, and Harford Mutual undertook Jacobson's defense.47
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 73 Md. App. 670, 536 A.2d 120, cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988).
41. Id. at 682, 541 A.2d at 126.
42. Id. at 67, 536 A.2d at 121. Shapiro died in March 1983; consequently, Martin Jacob-
son became the personal representative of Shapiro's estate and was a party to this case
while serving in that capacity. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 673-74, 536 A.2d at 122.
45. Id. at 673, 536 A.2d at 121.
46. Id., 536 A.2d at 121-22.
47. Id. at 674, 536 A.2d at 122.
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In the course of the defense, Harford Mutual learned that Keisha
Carter had been diagnosed with lead poisoning on September 8,
1982, nine months prior to the inception of the Harford Mutual pol-
icy.48 Consequently, Harford Mutual withdrew from Jacobson's de-
fense, contending that because Keisha Carter's injuries manifested
themselves before the inception of the policy, the occurrence alleged
in the suit did not arise during the policy period.49 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals agreed, °5 characterizing Mraz as holding that "the occur-
rence is judged by the time at which the leakage and damage are first
discovered."5' Accordingly, the court held that "the date of an 'occur-
rence' for purposes of determining coverage under an insurance pol-
icy is the date when the harm is first discovered."5 2 In essence, the
Court of Special Appeals expanded the Mraz manifestation trigger for
property damage claims to include bodily injury claims. Thus, the
Harford Mutual policy was held to afford no coverage because Keisha
Carter's injuries became manifest before the policy took effect.5"
The Jacobson court failed to recognize that the Mraz court had
invoked the manifestation trigger only because it found that it was
"difficult, if not impossible," to determine the time of the actual in-
jury.54 In short, the Jacobson court employed the Mraz rule in the ab-
sence of circumstances justifying its application. The Jacobson court
reasoned that once an injury is manifest, the occurrence causing that
injury already has happened, and therefore no insurance policy
purchased thereafter can cover damages for any injury arising out of
that occurrence.55 This conclusion is flawed because it assumes that
the occurrence must happen during the policy period in order for the
policy to cover the resulting harm,5 6 when in fact it is the happening of
bodily injury or property damage during the policy period that triggers
48. Id,
49. Id.
50. Id. at 684, 536 A.2d at 127.
51. Id. at 682, 536 A.2d at 126.
52. Id. at 684, 536 A.2d at 127 (citing Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d
1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986)).
53. Id.
54. See Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328 ("Determining exactly when damage begins can be diffi-
cult, if not impossible. In such cases we believe that the better rule is that the occurrence is
deemed to take place when the injuries first manifest themselves."). The Mraz court recog-
nized that the question of whether the policy was triggered should be answered by deter-
mining when the complaining party actually suffered damage, if possible. See id. See also
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
55. See Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v.Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 684, 536 A.2d 120, 127, cert.
denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988).
56. Id at 684, 536 A.2d at 127 (holding that the date of discovery of the harm is the
date of the "occurrence").
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coverage.5 7 The "occurrence"-which can include ongoing acciden-
tal conduct-may happen before or during the policy period and
may, for that matter, continue after the expiration of the policy
period.58
Mraz and Jacobson together established a clear rule in Maryland
that a form CGL insurance policy was triggered solely by the manifes-
tation of the bodily injury or property damage that gave rise to the
claim for which coverage was sought. Consequently, only the policy in
effect on the date of the first manifestation of the bodily injury or
property damage could afford coverage.59
2. Analysis.-The "manifestation" trigger theory sometimes
works to the advantage of the insured' and sometimes to the advan-
57. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 26, § 9.01 ("The Standard CGL policy provides
coverage for bodily injury and property damage which occurs during the policy period.
Thus, subject to policy terms and conditions, a CGL insurer's duty to indemnify is 'trig-
gered' by a determination that fortuitous bodily injury or property damage occurred dur-
ing the policy period.").
58. See id § 8.03[a], at 256 & n.2; see also ABRAmAM, supra note 1, at 288. In 1966, an
.occurrence" was defined as "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions." Id
at 299 (quoting from the 1966 standard CGL policy). Under the 1973 definition, an "oc-
currence" was "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions." Id at
288 (quoting from the 1973 standard CGL policy) (emphasis added). In 1966 and 1973,
the occurrence definition included the requirement that the accident be one that results
in bodily injury or property damage. Id. at 288, 299. In 1986, however, the definition was
modified to provide that continuous or repeated exposure must be to "substantially the
same harmful conditions" for a resulting injury to constitute an "occurrence." Id. at 282
(quoting from the 1986 standard CGL policy).
TheJacobson court's failure to distinguish between "occurrence" and "injury" may have
resulted from its reliance on two cases, Bartholomew v. Insurance Co. of North America,
502 F. Supp. 246 (D.R.I. 1980), affd, 655 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1981), and Appalachian Insur-
ance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1982). In both of these
cases, the court answered the question of whether an insured can obtain coverage for
property damage or bodily injury after discovering the damage or injury, Bartholomew, 502
F. Supp. at 254-56; Appalachian, 676 F.2d at 63. This is not a trigger question at all; rather,
it is a question of the nature of losses against which insurance can be purchased. Both
Bartholomew and Appalachian stand for the logical proposition that an insured may not ob-
tain coverage for a loss of which the insured is aware because "the purpose of insurance is
to protect insureds against unknown risks." Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 63 (emphasis
added). Accord Planters & Citizens Bank v. Home Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 977 (S.D. Ga.
1992), aff'd, 992 F.2d 328 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing whether the plaintiff knew about the
damage before he purchased the policy). Therefore, Bartholomew and Appalachian do not
support the decision in Jacobson, where the manifestation of injury resulted in a denial of
coverage even though the insured (Jacobson, as representative of Shapiro's estate) was
unaware of the injury (which Keisha Carter, a third party to the insurance contract, suf-
fered). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 53, 55 and accompanying text.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. Courts often apply the manifestation trig-
ger to promote coverage and benefit the insured in a highly arbitrary manner. For exam-
ple, the court in Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 682 F.2d 12
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tage of the insurer.6 1 In every case, however, the manifestation trigger
is inconsistent with the standard CGL policy because it ignores lan-
guage that specifically provides that the policy covers only bodily in-
jury or property damage that "occurs during the policy period."6 2
Thus, when the Mraz and Jacobson courts held that manifestation trig-
gered policy coverage, they failed to follow the rule in Maryland that
insurance contracts are to be interpreted in a manner that will give
their words their "customary and normal meaning."63
B. Abandoning the Manifestation Trigger in Favor of the
Injuy-in-Fact Trigger
1. The Cases.-The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the
problems associated with the manifestation trigger in Lloyd E. Mitchell,
Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co." In that case, the highest court of Mary-
land addressed for the first time the question that has spawned the
tremendous run of insurance coverage litigation in the last decade:
how to allocate among two or more insurers responsibility for claims
asserted by individuals suffering from asbestos-related injuries.6 5
Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. (Mitchell) was a mechanical contractor en-
gaged in the sale and distribution of products containing asbestos.66
Between 1955 and 1977, Mitchell was insured by the Maryland Casu-
alty Company under a series of standard CGL policies.6 7 After the
Maryland Casualty policies expired, individuals who were exposed to
(lst Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983), explicitly found that the manifestation
trigger afforded the insured greater protection than the exposure trigger. Id. at 23. The
court's conclusion was based on the specific circumstances of that case, where "Eagle-
Picher was uninsured during the longest period of exposure." Id.
61. The manifestation trigger benefits insurers when the policies in effect at the time
of manifestation-typically newer policies-have large deductibles, or when the coverage
limits of the policy or policies in effect at the time of manifestation are less than the cover-
age limits of all of the policies in effect during a prolonged period of exposure. Indeed, in
this regard, it is noteworthy that the manifestation trigger benefitted the insurers both in
Mraz and in Jacobson. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39, 52-53.
62. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 299 (quoting from the definition of "occurrence" in
the 1966 standard CGL policy).
63. Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 73 Md. App. 670, 680, 536 A.2d 120, 125, cert.
denied 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988).
64. 324 Md. 44, 595 A.2d 469 (1991).
65. Id. at 46, 595 A.2d at 470.
66. Id.
67. Id. The policies defined an occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id. at 47, 595 A.2d at 470.
The policies defined "bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease sustained by any
person which occurs during the policy period including death at any time resulting there-
from." Id.
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asbestos products that Mitchell allegedly sold or distributed sued the
company.68 Because the asbestos-related claims arose out of bodily
injury that first manifested itself after the Maryland Casualty policies
had expired, Maryland Casualty refused to defend or indemnify
Mitchell in connection with those claims.69 In an ensuing declaratory
judgment action to determine coverage, Maryland Casualty moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the bodily injuries giving rise to the
claims were not discovered until after the Maryland Casualty policies
had expired.7" Mitchell, in turn, cross-moved for summary judgment,
claiming that its Maryland Casualty policies required the insurer to
defend and indemnify against any claims for bodily injury that re-
sulted from exposure to asbestos during the policy periods, whether
or not the bodily injury first manifested itself after the expiration of
the policies.7'
Based on the undisputed fact that the asbestos-related diseases
did not become manifest until after the Maryland Casualty policies
had expired, the trial court granted Maryland Casualty's motion for
summary judgment and declared that the policies afforded no cover-
age for the asbestos-related claims.7" While Mitchell's appeal was
pending before the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to consider the trigger issue.73
The Court of Appeals focused its trigger analysis on when the
bodily injury occurred.7 4 By examining medical evidence concerning
the point at which the inhalation of asbestos fiber causes injury, the
Court of Appeals concluded that "'bodily injury' occurs when asbestos
is inhaled into the lung, and that, at a minimum, coverage under the
policy is triggered by exposure to the insured's asbestos products dur-
ing the policy period."75 The court based this conclusion on undis-
puted medical evidence that "the inhalation and retention of asbestos
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 48, 595 A.2d at 471.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 50, 595 A.2d at 472.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 57, 595 A.2d at 475. Although the decision in Lloyd E. Mitchell clearly was
based on when bodily injury occurred, the opinion also created a potential confusion with
respect to the trigger issue. The court stated that it is apparent from the policy "provisions
that coverage turns on the happening of an 'occurrence' during the policy period which
results in 'Bodily Injury.'" Id. By using the phrase "during the policy period" to modify
.occurrence" instead of "bodily injury," the court confused the time of the "occurrence"
with the time of the "bodily injury." In effect, the court invited lower courts to continue to
follow the mistaken analysis of Jacobson. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (criti-
cizing the Jacobson analysis).
75. Lloyd E. Mitchell, 324 Md. at 58, 595 A.2d at 476 (emphasis in original).
230 [VOL. 53:220
INSURANCE TRIGGERS IN MARYLAND
fibers may cause immediate harm to the cells and tissues of the
lung."76 As a result of its conclusion that injury occurred at the time
of exposure, rather than merely at the onset of the symptoms of in-
jury, the court vacated the judgment below and directed the trial
court to declare that the insurer was "required to provide a defense
for Mitchell against all personal injury asbestos-related suits brought
by plaintiffs allegedly exposed to Mitchell's asbestos products during
the policy period, regardless of when the alleged asbestos-related inju-
ries became manifest. " 77 In so holding, the Court of Appeals aban-
doned the manifestation trigger of insurance coverage in favor of the
injury-in-fact trigger.
Although the Mraz court also had recognized that the happening
of injury triggers coverage, 78 it concluded that proving the actual time
of the occurrence of the injury in question was too difficult, and so
opted for a rule that deemed the injury to occur at manifestation.7 a
The Mitchell court started with the same legal premise-that the oc-
currence of actual injury or damage during the policy period triggers
coverage-and then proceeded into the factual fray to determine
when the bodily injury actually occurred. 0
In Haford County v. Harford Mutual Insurance Co.,"1 the Court of
Appeals used the same injury-in-fact approach to analyze a coverage
dispute arising out of property damage claims. Between 1954 and
1982, Harford County operated five landfills.8 2 The county purchased
CGL insurance policies from the Insurance Company of North
America from 1958 to 1964, from Harford Mutual Insurance Com-
pany from 1965 to 1980, and from The Home Insurance Company
from 1980 to 1982.83 The Harford Mutual and Home policies pro-
vided coverage for property damage occurring during the policy
period.84
After the policies at issue had expired, Harford County discov-
ered that its landfills were leaking and that pollutants had seeped into
the underlying groundwater.8 5 In the declaratory judgment action
76. Id. at 61, 595 A.2d at 477.
77. Id. at 63, 595 A.2d at 478.
78. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986). See
also supra note 36.
79. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328. See also supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
80. Lloyd E. Mitchell, 324 Md. at 58, 61, 595 A.2d at 476, 477. See also supra notes 75-76
and accompanying text.
81. 327 Md. 418, 610 A.2d 286 (1992).
82. Id. at 420, 610 A.2d at 287.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 421-22, 610 A.2d at 287.
85. Id. at 422, 610 A.2d at 288.
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that ensued, the insurers attempted to distinguish Lloyd E. Mitchell on
the ground that it involved claims for bodily injury rather than for
property damage and that there was medical evidence showing that
bodily injury occurred immediately upon the victim's inhalation of as-
bestos fibers.8 6 The insurers insisted thatJacobson and Mraz controlled
because, like Mraz, Harford County involved the leakage of pollutants,
which did not result in immediate property damage.8 7 Harford
County, on the other hand, contended that regardless of whether the
underlying claim arose from bodily injury or property damage, the
language of the policies required the court to employ the Lloyd E.
Mitchell analysis.8 8 The Court of Appeals agreed with Harford County,
noting that
nothing in the language of the policies, affording words
their ordinary and accepted meanings, requires that the
claimed property damage actually be discovered or mani-
fested during the policy period; rather, it is the occurrence
of property damage, as defined in the policies, within the
policy period that triggers coverage. 9
The Harford County court recognized, as did the Fourth Circuit in
Mraz, that it can be difficult to determine exactly when property dam-
age resulted from the leakage of contaminants from a landfill. 90 Un-
like the Mraz court, however, the Court of Appeals did not regard that
difficulty as a justification for abandoning the language of the poli-
cies.9" Instead, the court noted that the factual determination of
when the property damage actually occurred was "quite likely a matter
for expert testimony."92 Accordingly, the court charged the parties
with proving when the injury for which they sought coverage actually
86. I& at 433-34, 610 A.2d at 293-94.
87. Id. at 434, 610 A.2d at 294.
88. Id. at 429-30, 610 A.2d at 291-92.
89. Id. at 435, 610 A.2d at 294. Apparently following its language in Lloyd E. Mitchell,
the Court of Appeals in Harford County again made the potentially confusing statement that
"[f]rom [the policy] provisions, it is clear that coverage turns on the happening of an 'occur-
rence' during the policy period, which results in 'property damage.'" Id. at 434, 610 A.2d
at 294. See also supra note 74 (discussing the Lloyd E. Mitchell court's use of similar lan-
guage). Although the court undertook the correct analysis, it failed to apply the phrase
"during the policy period" to modify "property damage" instead of "occurrence." In fact,
as the analysis in the opinion indicates, coverage is triggered when the insured property
suffers damage during the policy period. Harford County, 327 Md. at 435, 610 A.2d at 294.
90. See Harford County, 327 Md. at 435, 610 A.2d at 294.
91. See id
92. Id. at 436, 610 A.2d at 295.
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occurred, instead of deeming that the injury occurred at the time it
first became manifest.9
3
2. Analysis.--But for the wrong turn taken in Jacobson, the evolu-
tion from Mraz to Lloyd E. Mitchell and Harford County would be essen-
tially a change in the requirement of proof rather than a change in
the interpretation of the standard insurance contract. The Mraz, Lloyd
E. Mitchell, and Harford County courts all acknowledged that injury or
damage during the policy period triggered coverage under the pol-
icy.94 The Mraz court simply "deemed" the injury to have occurred
upon manifestation,95 while the Lloyd E. Mitchell and Harford County
courts required the parties to produce proof on the issue.96
"Deeming," in the trigger context, is dangerous. Each of the trig-
ger theories, other than injury-in-fact, in effect deems injury or prop-
erty damage to occur at a particular time-upon exposure, at
manifestation, or during the entire period between exposure and
manifestation. Each theory in which the injury is "deemed" to occur
at a fixed point or period in time may be accurate or inaccurate in a
given case, depending upon the nature of the underlying injury or
damage. But none of the theories, except injury-in-fact, will be accu-
rate in every case.
Some injuries, such as a noise-induced hearing loss, occur solely
upon exposure to the injury-causing agent.97 In such cases, the expo-
sure trigger is consistent with the language of the standard CGL policy
because the injury indeed occurs solely upon exposure. In other in-
stances, as in the case of spalling bricks on a building, the damage can
occur only upon manifestation.9" In such cases, an exposure trigger
would miss the mark. Finally, there are instances in which neither a
93. Id. at 435-36, 610 A.2d at 294-95.
94. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986); Lloyd
E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 324 Md. 44, 57, 62, 595 A.2d 469, 475, 478
(1991); Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 327 Md. 418, 435-36, 610 A.2d 286, 294-
95 (1992).
95. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328.
96. Lloyd E. Mitchell, 324 Md. at 61-62, 595 A.2d at 477-78; Harford County, 327 Md. at
436, 610 A.2d at 295.
97. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
113 S. Ct. 692, 699 (1993) ("The injury, loss of hearing, occurs simultaneously with the
exposure to excessive noise. Moreover, the injury is complete when the exposure ceases.").
98. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267, 271
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Trizec Properties v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 810, 813 n.5 (11th
Cir. 1985) ("Because this damage [spalling bricks] was aesthetic rather than structural, the
[American Ins. Co.] court merely held the date of the damage was the time the spalling was
first noticed. Prior to the date that this type of damage becomes apparent, the com-
plaining party has simply suffered no injury.").
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pure exposure trigger nor a pure manifestation trigger would be ap-
propriate. For example, in asbestos exposure cases, courts have found
that initial injury occurs upon exposure and progresses following
exposure. 99
The possibilities concerning when bodily injury or property dam-
age actually occur are innumerable. Because standard CGL policies
are triggered by the occurrence of bodily injury or property damage
during the policy period, and because injury or damage may occur
upon exposure, at manifestation, or at some time in between, any at-
tempt to impose in every case a single trigger theory-be it manifesta-
tion, exposure, or the triple trigger-inevitably will fail. The only
trigger that accurately applies in every case is the injury-in-fact trigger,
which recognizes that the time of actual injury or damage will vary
with the circumstances of each case.
C. Implications of the Injury-in-Fact Trigger
Although true to the language of the policies, the Lloyd E. Mitchell
and Harford County injury-in-fact trigger implies important and poten-
tially troubling difficulties for the resolution of insurance coverage
disputes under Maryland law. The simple factual inquiry that Mraz
and Jacobson required is replaced by a more demanding inquiry into
when, over the course of a potentially long period of time, latent bod-
ily injury or property damage actually occurred. Moreover, the bur-
den of showing that bodily injury or property damage occurred within
the relevant policy period rests with the insured.' For this reason,
insureds and prudent insurers must be prepared to offer proof con-
cerning when the injury or damage for which coverage is sought actu-
ally occurred.
As the Mraz court pointed out, proving when injury or damage
actually occurred poses a difficult problem.' 0 ' In Harford County, the
Court of Appeals indicated that expert testimony can solve the prob-
lem.10 2 In many cases, the expert will be able to provide the fact
99. SeeJ.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 1993)
("The asbestosis process continues to progress even after exposure to asbestos ceases.").
100. Harford County v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 327 Md. 418, 436, 610 A.2d 286, 295
(1992). See also Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[T] he language of these policies demands that the insured prove that an exposure caused
an injury during the policy period.") (emphasis added).
101. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Deter-
mining exactly when damage begins can be difficult, if not impossible.").
102. Harford County, 327 Md. at 436, 610 A.2d at 295 ("Whether at any time during the
policy period the discharge of contaminants into the soil and underlying groundwater is of
sufficient gravity to prove detectable 'property damage' within the policies' definition of
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finder an opinion concerning when the injury or damage actually oc-
curred. Inevitably, however, cases will arise in which it is impossible to
sort out which injury or damage occurred in which policy year. Mary-
land courts and litigants now must consider how to handle this
eventuality.
IV. WHERE EXPERT TESTIMONY Is NOT ENOUGH-THE DIFFICULT
CASES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
When expert testimony cannot provide proof as to the time of
injury, some default approach to apportioning the damages among
the potentially applicable policies becomes necessary. The Mraz mani-
festation trigger is one possible default approach. For reasons already
discussed,1"3 however, it is not the best approach. Another possibility
is to relieve insurers of responsibility altogether if the insured cannot
prove during which policy period the injury or damage occurred. It
that term is quite likely a matter for expert testimony."). When offering expert testimony
to prove when the injury or damage actually occurred, the parties should keep a number of
factors in mind. First, the expert witness should distinguish new property damage from
existing property damage, which resulted "because of" deteriorating conditions. See Auto-
tronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). This
distinction must be drawn because the policies in effect at the time of the new property
damage would be the proper source of coverage for the new damage, while the policies in
effect at the time of the original damage would be the proper source of coverage for the
damage that occurs "because of" those conditions.
For example, in the case of an automobile accident which occurs in year one, the
insurer covering the insured in year one must afford coverage, subject to limits of liability,
for the plaintiff's medical costs incurred in year two "because of" the accident. Likewise, if
a landfill leaks contaminants into the groundwater in year one, the harm that results "be-
cause of" that leakage is the responsibility of the year-one insurer, even if the harm occurs
in year two, year three, or any time thereafter.
Progressive injuries or damages-that is, injuries or damages that continue to worsen
even after the conduct causing them has stopped-present especially difficult problems of
proof. Whether Maryland courts will factor the "because of" issue into the injury-in-fact
inquiry remains to be seen.
One court has been presented with a formula that incorporated the "because of" lan-
guage of the policy. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212 (6th Cir. 1980). The court summarized:
Thus, if three insurance companies were on the risk for a 9 year period of expo-
sure, under Forty-Eight's formula the first insurer would be on the risk for the
first 3 years plus the remaining 6 while the disease progressed. The second in-
surer would be on the risk for 3 years plus the following 3 years. The final insurer
would be on the risk only for the final 3 years. Thus liability would be appor-
tioned 9/18 for the first insurer, 6/18 for the second, and 3/18 for the third.
Under the district court's formula, of course, each insurer would be liable for 1/3
of the costs.
I& at 1226. The Sixth Circuit described Forty-Eight's approach as an "interesting formula,"
but refused to adopt it, stating that it would lead to an "anomalous result." Id. In fact, the
suggested formula appears to be consistent with the "because of" language in the policy.
103. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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is, after all, the insured party's burden to prove the existence of cover-
age.1 °4 On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the "oc-
curring during the policy period" language was intended to create an
insurmountable obstacle that bars coverage altogether. It would be
harsh indeed to send the insured away with no coverage because it
could not offer evidence on a point that all parties agreed was not
susceptible of proof.
A. Joint and Several Liability
Some courts have adopted a "joint and several" approach to ap-
portioning liability, whereby each insurer on the risk during any pe-
riod when bodily injury or property damage occurred is responsible
for the full amount of the loss, subject to its policy limit.10 5 For exam-
ple, an insurer providing $20,000,000 of coverage during one year of a
property damage loss occurring over thirty years and totalling
$30,000,000, would owe the full policy limit of $20,000,000 rather
than 1/30 of $30,000,000 or $1,000,000.
The Keene Corp. and JH. France Refractories Co. courts used this
approach to apportion damages for asbestos-related injuries. 106 A
brief background on the issues presented by coverage disputes in the
asbestos-related injury context is helpful in understanding the joint
and several liability approach and its shortcomings.
In asbestos-related injury litigation, the finder of fact must resolve
the difficult factual issue of when a person who was exposed to asbes-
tos over an extended period of time actually suffered bodily injury.
The France court concluded, based on medical evidence, that a person
who inhales asbestos fibers suffers bodily injury within minutes of ex-
posure. "7 Additionally, both the Keene and France courts found, as a
factual matter, that injury continues to occur from the time of expo-
sure, through a latency period during which the injury becomes
worse, up to the point at which the asbestos-related disease is diag-
104. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Acands, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968
(3d Cir. 1985); Sandoz, Inc. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.J.
1983); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Cal. Ct. App.),
review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (1992); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626
A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. 1993) (holding that "each insurer which was on the risk during the
development of an asbestosis-related disease is a primary insurer").
106. See supra note 105. Thejoint and several approach also has been used in coverage
litigation involving latent injuries resulting from ingesting prescription drugs, see Sandoz,
Inc., 554 F. Supp. at 257, and long-term damage to real property from erosion. See City of
Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663.
107. JH. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 505-06.
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nosed.1"8 Accordingly, both courts found that all policies on the risk
from the time of exposure through the time of diagnosis had been
triggered.'0 9
Having reached this conclusion, the Keene and France courts faced
the problem of allocating liability among the insurers whose policies
had been triggered." 0 Both courts concluded that each insurer on
the risk during any part of the period between exposure and manifes-
tation was jointly and severally liable for the entire claim. 11'
The France court offered several justifications for this conclu-
sion.11' First, the court relied on language found in the standard CGL
insuring agreements at issue providing that the insurer would "pay on
behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury to which this
insurance applies." 1 3 The court reasoned that, once the occurrence
of a bodily injury had triggered each policy, each policy became obli-
gated by its terms to pay "all sums" the insured owed as a result of the
injury.114
This reasoning is faulty, however, because each policy provides
coverage only for "bodily injury .. .which occurs during the policy pe-
riod."115 Accordingly, although bodily injury may span the entire
twenty-year period from exposure to manifestation, the bodily injury
to which the year-one policy applies is only the bodily injury occurring
in year one, not the bodily injury occurring in years two through
twenty. Likewise, the bodily injury to which the year-two policy applies
is only the bodily injury occurring in year two, not the injury occur-
ring in year one or in years three through twenty. Moreover, the "all
sums" language modifies "damages because of bodily injury . . . to
which this insurance applies."" 6 Because the insurance applies only to
bodily injury that occurs during the policy period," 7 the court's state-
ment that "[w] e have already ascertained that any stage of the develop-
ment of the claimant's disease constitutes an injury 'to which this
108. See Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1046; JH. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 506.
109. Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1042-46; JH. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 508.
110. See Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1051; JH. France Reftactories Co., 626 A-2d at 508-09.
111. Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1051; JH. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 508-09.
112. JH. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 507-08.
113. Id at 507.
114. Id. at 507-08.
115. Id at 507 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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insurance applies' under each policy in effect during any part of the
development of the disease" 18 plainly is incorrect.
Second, the France court correctly observed that, because the dis-
ease asbestosis does not progress linearly, a pro rata apportionment of
liability does not accurately reflect how much bodily injury occurred
during the course of each policy.1" 9 Consequently, the court rejected
a pro rata apportionment of liability in favor of joint and several
liability.1 20
The inability of the pro rata approach to track precisely the actual
rate of injury or damage, however, is not a sound basis for adopting
the joint and several approach. Although a pro rata approach will not
precisely track the amount of bodily injury occurring during each pol-
icy period, it will approximate more closely the actual rate of bodily
injury-which is impossible to determine precisely in any event-than
will a joint and several approach. In short, pro rata liability is consis-
tent with the fundamental premise that the policy covers bodily injury
or property damage that occurs during the policy period, while the joint
and several approach abandons that premise altogether.
Third, the France court relied on the definition of "occurrence" as
a justification for imposing joint and several liability. 12' Because the
definition of "occurrence" includes "continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions which result in bodily injury,"122 the court reasoned that
injury occurring over a long period of time likewise must be cov-
ered.1 23 In so concluding, the court confused the concept of "bodily
injury" with the concept of "occurrence." Bodily injury refers to "bod-
ily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs
during the policy period, including death at any time resulting there-
from."1 24 Occurrence refers to "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury. "125
Although the occurrence can take place at any time, the bodily injury
must take place during the policy period. 126 Because the France and
118. JH. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 507.
119. Id. at 508.
120. Id.
121. Id
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 287 (quoting from the 1973 standard CGL policy).
125. Id. at 288 (quoting from the 1973 standard CGL policy).
126. In pre-1966 CGL policies, an occurrence was defined simply as an "accident." See
id. at 299 (quoting from the 1966 standard CGL policy). This definition was consistent
with the fundamental notion that the purpose of insurance is to provide coverage for dam-
ages owed as a result of a fortuitous event. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The
definition of occurrence was changed in 1973 to reflect the realization that some accidents
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Keene courts failed to distinguish the two concepts, they applied joint
and several liability to cases that did not warrant its application. In
short, each of the grounds that the France court offered to support the
joint and several approach fails to withstand close scrutiny.
B. Pro Rata Liability
Some courts have concluded that if an insured party offers expert
testimony showing that there is no basis for determining how the bod-
ily injury or property damage should be apportioned among the pol-
icy periods, and if no insurer is able to offer contradictory testimony,
then the injury or damage claim should be allocated pro rata among
the policy periods.' 7 Applying Maryland law, Judge Motz of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland recently em-
ployed the pro rata approach in Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. American
Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.'" 8
Scottsdale Insurance Co. involved the question of which of three in-
surers was responsible for covering lead poisoning claims asserted on
behalf of a child.' 29 From her birth onJanuary 17, 1983, untilJune 6,
1985, Candace Anthony resided on Homestead Avenue in Baltimore
City.' 3° On June 6, 1985, Candace and her mother moved to 2534
Garrett Avenue, where they lived until July 1986.131 For the thirteen
months that Candace lived at 2534 Garrett Avenue, the property was
insured; the first four months were covered by American Empire, and
the remaining nine months were insured by Scottsdale.13 2
In 1986, Candace's mother filed suit individually and on
Candace's behalf in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging that
occur over a period of time. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 288. Thus, the definition of
occurrence was modified to include "continuous or repeated exposure to conditions." Id.
(quoting from the 1973 standard CGL policy).
The definition of "bodily injury," however, continued to include only "bodily injury,
sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period." Id. at
287 (quoting from the 1973 standard CGL policy). This definition is not limited to bodily
injury that results from a single exposure, but encompasses bodily injury that results from a
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions over an extended period of time.
127. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1224-25
(6th Cir. 1980), reh'ggranted and clarfied, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109
(1981); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368,1392-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Porter
v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109
(1981); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 76 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
128. 811 F. Supp. 210 (D. Md. 1993).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The Garrett Avenue address was insured by American Empire from June 6,
1985 until October 8, 1985, and by Scottsdale from October 8, 1985 until October 8, 1986.
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Candace had sustained lead poisoning as a result of ingesting lead
paint at both the Homestead Avenue and the Garrett Avenue ad-
dresses.1 3 This suit was settled for $190,000, with Scottsdale contrib-
uting $152,500 and GEICO, which insured the Homestead Avenue
property, contributing $37,500."M American Empire did not contrib-
ute to the settlement. 135
Following the settlement of Candace Anthony's lead paint claim,
Scottsdale sought contribution or indemnity from American Em-
pire. i13 Judge Motz recognized that, although the Maryland Court of
Appeals did not expressly overrule Jacobson in Lloyd E. Mitchell or
Harford County, Jacobson's manifestation trigger no longer was the law
in Maryland.' 3 7 American Empire apparently conceded this point.
Nevertheless, it argued that Scottsdale was not entitled to contribution
or indemnity because Scottsdale could not prove the amount of the
lead paint poisoning that occurred during American Empire's four-
month policy period.13
The court disagreed, finding that even though Scottsdale could
not prove precisely what portion of the child's lead poisoning had
occurred during the first four months of her thirteen-month resi-
dency at 2534 Garrett Avenue, it had not failed to prove its claim.'3 9
The court awarded Scottsdale pro rata contribution based upon the
respective lengths of Candace's residency at 2534 Garrett Avenue dur-
ing the two policy periods.14 ° Thus, in the absence of more accurate
proof, the court employed a pro rata approach to determine the
amount of injury that occurred during each policy period and to ap-
portion the resulting liability.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 210.
137. Id. at 215 ("[A] though the Court of Appeals has not specifically addressed the 'trig-
ger' question in the lead poisoning context, it is clear to me that the transition from Mraz
to Harford Counly demonstrates that exposure plus bodily injury (even if unmanifested) is
now sufficient under Maryland law to trigger coverage.").
138. Id. Anthony's medical expert, Dr. Chisolm, could not state the exact time at which
Candace first ingested lead at 2534 Garrett Avenue. Id. at 211. He testified that Candace
sustained lead poisoning throughout the duration of her residence there, however. Id.
American Empire adopted the position that if Scottsdale could not prove the amount of
bodily injury that occurred during American Empire's policy period, Scottsdale's claim
would fail altogether. Id. at 215-16.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 217-18.
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C. The Implications of Pro Rata and Joint and Several Liability
As between pro rata and joint and several liability, the pro rata
approach is more consistent with the language of the standard CGL
policy. The approach that Maryland courts finally choose to adopt
will have significant repercussions. The choice between pro rata and
joint and several liability will affect not only whether an insurer is lia-
ble for injury occurring during periods of time which the insured car-
ried no insurance,1 4 ' but also whether the insured can select which of
the triggered policies will pay the claim.' 42
1. The Effect of Self-Insured Years.-Under the joint and several
approach to liability, the insured party would have responsibility for
injury that occurred during years in which it purchased no insurance
at all.' 43 In other words, the joint and several approach fails to incor-
porate judge Weinstein's truism that "[s]elf-insurance is called 'going
bare' for a reason." 144
The rationale that each insurer is obligated to pay "all sums" for
which the insured party becomes liable, which was advanced by the
France court in support ofjoint and several liability among insurers, 145
effectively would shield insureds from liability for uninsured years. 146
The crux of the "all sums" theory is that an insurer on the risk for
even one year is responsible for all sums owed by the insured for in-
jury, any portion of which, however small, occurred during that
year. 147  From this theory, it follows that if the insured party
purchased coverage for only one year of a twenty-year period of loss,
the insurer would be obligated to cover the entire loss, thereby absolv-
141. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 126-28 (discussing "The Problem of Unin-
sured Years").
142. See generally id. at 120-22 (describing differences between pro rata and joint and
several liability). The selected insurer would have contribution rights against the other
triggered polities. Id) at 122.
143. SeeJ.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. 1993).
In a surprising twist, the France court decided that the insured was not responsible for
uninsured years because to hold otherwise would create "a judicial fiction which cannot be
supported, viz., that J.H. France was self-insured under a policy the terms of which are
ascertainable so thatJ.H. France may be included among the insurers in apportionment of
liability." Id. Apparently, the court believed that the absence of an actual contract of self-
insurance absolvedJ.H. France from liability. See id. This is akin to the argument that a law
student should suffer no consequences from failing to appear for an exam because the
professor could not grade the exam that the student failed to write.
144. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1392 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
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ing the insured of any responsibility. This illogical conclusion demon-
strates that the "all sums" basis of joint and several liability is faulty.
Employing reasoning analogous to that of the France court, the
Keene court likewise concluded that the insured bears absolutely no
responsibility for uninsured years. 1 48 The Keene court rhetorically in-
quired as to what the limits of liability would be if the insured party
were held responsible for the uninsured years. 49 This question erro-
neously assumes that the insured's liability for uninsured years should
be limited by something other than the actual amount owed to third
parties.' 50 On the contrary, the appropriate limit on a partially in-
sured party's liability logically should be the balance above the sum
owed by insurers on triggered policies. Self-insurance is, by its nature,
without limits.
2. Which Policies Will Pay the Claim.-The France court found
that, under a joint and several approach to liability, the insured is
"free to select the policy or policies under which it is to be indemni-
fied."' 5 ' Furthermore, "each insurer which was on the risk during the
development of an asbestos-related disease is a primary insurer."1 52
This rule permits the insured party to obtain indemnification for mul-
tiple years of injury from one year of coverage.' Doing so permits
the insured party to impose liability on an excess carrier, which col-
lected a relatively small premium in relation to its limit of liability,
before the insured seeks indemnification from a first-layer carrier,
which collected a significantly higher premium. This is manifestly un-
148. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
149. Id at 1049.
150. Furthermore, the fact that the court sought to limit the insured party's exposure to
liability at the expense of the insurers, even if the insurers had never assumed the risk of
that liability, is reminiscent of the court's general result-oriented desire to expand the
boundaries of insurance coverage. See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
151. J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. 1993).
152. Id
153. See Aa HAM, supra note 1, at 227-28.
[E]xcess policies normally afford coverage in excess of the "underlying" limits of
liability afforded by the insured's primary or lower-layer excess policies .... The
question then arises, which "underlying" limits of liability must be exhausted in
order to trigger a particular excess policy-only the limits of liability of the policy
issued in the same year as a triggered policy, or the limits of all the primary poli-
cies that have been triggered to provide coverage against the liability in question?
Although few courts have as yet addressed whether there must be exhaustion by
years or exhaustion by layers, the issue promises to become increasingly important as
primary limits of liability are pierced and excess coverage against environmental
liability is potentially triggered.
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fair. Moreover, it is unfair to allow the insured party to reap the bene-
fits of coverage for multiple years of ongoing injury while paying a
deductible in only one year.
Thus, the joint and several liability approach adopted in Keene
Corp. and JH. France Refractories Co. produces three paradoxical re-
sults. First, it allows insureds who choose to remain uninsured to es-
cape liability altogether, so long as they have purchased at least one
insurance policy during the period of injury. Second, it gives the in-
sured the choice of seeking indemnification from excess policies prior
to triggered primary policies. Finally, it permits insureds to unfairly
obtain coverage for multiple years of injury while paying only one
year's deductible. In short, the consequences of the joint and several
liability approach violate both the language of the CGL insurance pol-
icy and common sense. The pro rata approach, however, yields none
of these illogical results.
CONCLUSION
In choosing to abandon the manifestation trigger in favor of the
injury-in-fact trigger, the Maryland Court of Appeals has taken a signif-
icant step in the right direction. Maryland courts now must consider
how to apportion coverage properly among two or more triggered
policies where evidence concerning the rate at which bodily injury or
property damage occurred is not available. The analytically sound so-
lution is to apportion liability pro rata among triggered policy periods.
Under this method, the insurers in each year of coverage would be
liable for the percentage of the total loss that occurred during that
year. The insured party would be held responsible for paying the ap-
plicable policy deductibles in each year for which coverage is trig-
gered and would not escape liability for injury occurring during years
in which it had purchased no insurance.
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